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ITALY AND THE AQUARIUS: A 
MIGRANT CRISIS 
Alexandra Larkin* 
ABSTRACT 
Italian journalist Indro Montanelli once wrote, “[w]e 
Italians are tolerant and civil with all those who are different.  
Black, red, yellow. Especially when they are far away, at a 
telescopic distance from us.”1  In recent years, Italy had a 
resurgence of nationalist and far-right political leaders, who 
have taken an anti-immigration stance.2  Public interest in 
migration of refugees and asylum seekers is due both to media 
coverage of their stories3 and to litigation4 before international 
courts.5  One high-profile story that made headlines in the 
                                                          
*Alexandra Larkin is Productions Editor of the Pace International Law Review 
at the Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University.  
1  FONDAZIONE LEONE MORESSA, II VALORE DELL’IMMIGRARZIONE 144 (2015) 
(original in Italian: “Siamo tolleranti e civili, noi italiani, nei confronti di tutti 
i diversi. Neri, rossi, gialli. Specie quando si trovano lontano, a distanza 
telescopica da noi.”). 
2  Andrea Mammone, Is fascism back on the rise in Italy?, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-
history/wp/2018/01/27/is-fascism-back-on-the-rise-in-
italy/?utm_term=.4a4f366ca6d; see also Melissa Bell, Saskya Vandoorne & 
Lauren Said-Moorhouse, Italy’s Matteo Salvini Says Being Called a Populist is 
‘A Compliment’, CNN WORLD (June 27, 2018), 
https://edition.cnn.com/2018/06/27/europe/matteo-salvini-interview-
intl/index.html (noting that Italy’s Interior Minister Matteo Salvini said that 
“being called a populist was ‘a compliment’ and claimed recent elections that 
brought right-wing, anti-immigrant parties to power were a sign European 
liberalism had failed.”).  
3  See, e.g., Ian Urbina, The Outlaw Ocean, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/24/world/the-outlaw-ocean.html 
(referencing New York Times series that discusses crime and violence in 
international waters, which often goes unpunished).  
4  See, e.g., M/V Saiga (No. 2) (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Case No. 2, 
Judgment of July 1, 1999, 2 ILTOS Rep. 10. (being one of the first cases decided 
by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea [ITLOS], this case 
involved, among other issues, standard of treatment of people on board vessels 
during enforcement action). 
5  IRINI PAPANICOLOPULU, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PROTECTION OF PEOPLE 
AT SEA 1 (2018) (discussing the rise in international law cases concerning the 
1
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summer of 2018 was Italy’s treatment of the Aquarius, a rescue 
vessel operated by the German non-governmental organization 
SOS Méditerranée and Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans 
Frontières.6 
 
This comment will focus on what the international 
community currently does to protect migrants at sea and what 
role international law has played and could play in the future.  
Part I will analyze whether Italy violated Article 33 of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ (UNHCR) 
1951 Refugee Convention.  Part II will analyze whether Italy 
violated the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
Article 1. Finally, Part III will be a brief discussion of other legal 
avenues that might be available to refugees. 
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contention surrounding the law of the sea).  
6  Ramzy Baroud & Romana Rubeo, What is behind the Aquarius refugee 
ship crisis?, AL JAZEERA (June 17, 2018),  
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/aquarius-refugee-ship-crisis-
180617091028528.html. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/4
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INTRODUCTION 
On June 1, 2018, Italy refused to allow the Aquarius access 
to its ports and disembark its passengers.7  The Aquarius was 
reported to have carried 123 unaccompanied minors and seven 
pregnant women.8  Passengers endured waves up to four meters 
and winds up to thirty-five knots.9  Many migrants on board 
suffered from seasickness and sought medical care from Doctors 
Without Borders, which operated alongside the boat.10  Italy’s 
Interior Minister at the time, Matteo Salvini, announced, “[f]rom 
today, Italy will start to say no to human trafficking, no to the 
business of illegal immigration.”11  In August 2018, after Malta 
and Italy refused the Aquarius’ requests to dock, Gibraltar 
revoked the Aquarius’ flag.12  Italian Transport Minister, Danilo 
Toninelli, urged the United Kingdom (UK) to “assume its 
responsibility”13 for the migrants because the ship sailed under 
the flag of Gibraltar, a British territory.14  The Aquarius’ flag or 
registration was removed for a second time, in September 2018, 
by the Panama Maritime Authority due to “blatant economic and 
political pressure”15 from the Italian government.16  In response, 
                                                          
7  Italy’s Matteo Salvini shuts ports to migrant rescue ship, BBC (June 11, 
2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44432056. 
8  Baroud & Rubeo, supra note 6. 
9  @SOSMedGermany, TWITTER (June 13, 2018, 4:08 PM), 
https://twitter.com/SOSMedGermany/status/1006991809699074050. 
10  Gianluca Mezzofiore, Hilary Clarke & Laura Smith-Spark, What it’s 
like on board the migrant ship to Spain, CNN WORLD (June 17, 2018, 6:02 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/14/europe/migrant-ship-italy-spain-
intl/index.html.  
11  Baroud & Rubeo, supra note 6. 
12  Jessie Yeung, Gibraltar ship stripped of flag amid dispute over 
migrants stranded at sea, CNN WORLD (Aug. 14, 2018, 5:20 AM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/14/europe/aquarius-migrants-stranded-
intl/index.html; see infra text accompanying notes 86–88 (discussing the ship’s 
flag). 
13  Danilo Toninelli (@DaniloToninelli), TWITTER (Aug. 13, 2018, 12:50 
AM), https://twitter.com/DaniloToninelli/status/1028911651356127233. 
14  Yeung, supra note 12. 
15  Matthew Weaver, Charities plea for help after Aquarius migrant rescue 
ship’s flag revoked, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 24, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/sep/24/italy-blamed-after-aquarius-
migrant-rescue-ships-flag-revoked.  
16  See Stephen Jewkes, Panama revokes registration of last migrant 
rescue ship in central Mediterranean, REUTERS (Sept. 23, 2018, 2:03 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-italy-migration-aquarius-panama-
3
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Italy’s Interior Minister Salvini denied that Italy had put 
pressure on Panama and tweeted that he did not know the 
telephone area code for Panama.17  Once a ship is de-flagged, it 
is not allowed to operate again unless it can find a new flag.18 
 
In 2017, Italy received 128,850 asylum requests,19 a 
significant increase from the 83,540 requests received in 2015.20  
Malta’s Prime Minister, Joseph Muscat, tweeted about Italy’s 
authorities on the night they refused the Aquarius stating that 
they “manifestly go against international rules” while 
simultaneously denying entry into Malta’s port.21  In response, 
Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, offered for the boat to 
dock in Valencia, Spain, on the following day.22  Subsequently, 
on June 24, 2018, twenty-eight European leaders23 met to 
discuss immigration at the European Union (EU) Commission 
headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.24  These discussions 
                                                          
idUSKCN1M30S9 (finding that the “SOS Mediterranee, one of the charities 
that operates the Aquarius, said in a statement it was reeling from news of the 
revocation, which it said followed pressure from the Italian government.”).  
17  Matteo Salvini (@matteosalvinimi), TWITTER (Sept. 23, 2018, 11:54 
AM), 
https://twitter.com/matteosalvinimi/status/1043936716522967045?ref_src=tw
src%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E10439367165229670
45&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2F (original tweet in Italian: “#Salvini: nessuna 
pressione su Panama per #Aquatius2, non so nemmeno che prefisso abbia 
Panama. #nonelarèna”).   
18  Jewkes, supra note 16. 
19  Statistical Office of the European Union Data, Asylum and first time 
asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated 
data(rounded), EUROSTAT, 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctza&la
ng=en (last visited Oct. 24, 2019). 
20  Id. 
21  Joseph Muscat (@JosephMuscat_JM), TWITTER (June 10, 2018, 2:04 
PM),  
https://twitter.com/JosephMuscat_JM/status/1005918671297024002. 
22  Spain to offer “safe port” for ‘Aquarius’ migrant rescue ship in Valencia, 
EL PAÍS (June 11, 2018, 4:57 PM), 
https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/06/11/inenglish/1528720717_398244.html.  
23  Eur. Council, Euro Summit (June 28–29, 2018), 
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35918/list-participants-euco-june-
2018.pdf (listing the attendees and guests of the Euro Summit in Brussels). 
24  Gabriela Baczynska & Robert-Jan Bartunek, Merkel presses over 
migration as ‘European solution’ fails, REUTERS (June 23, 2018, 7:26 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-summit/divided-eu-
leaders-convene-for-emergency-talks-on-migration-idUSKBN1JJ176.  
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/4
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reflected an ongoing debate among states about how to handle 
the large number of refugees seeking asylum.  On June 28, 2018, 
EU leaders, including Italy, signed off on a migration deal, 
aimed at easing the burden on countries like Italy.25  One of the 
main topics discussed at the conference was the feasibility of 
building migrant processing centers in North Africa, as an 
attempt to deter migrants from making “life-threatening 
journeys to Europe across the Mediterranean.”26  While the 
published agreement did not specify how these centers would be 
operated and how asylum procedures would be followed, it 
marks a recognition of the current migrant crisis and steps to 
alleviate it. 
 
Due to its location, Italy is among several “front-line” 
countries that have an unequal burden in receiving migrants 
and refugees trying to immigrate to Europe.27  This issue is 
further compounded by “a relief scheme led by Frontex, the EU’s 
Border and Coast Guard Agency, which [made] Italy the 
headquarters of all sea operations, and consequently a magnet 
for all rescued refugee boats.”28  Moreover, in 2003, the EU 
passed a law called the Dublin Regulation that determines 
which member nation is responsible for processing asylum 
applications.29  The Dublin Regulation established a 
fingerprinting database called the Eurodac.30  Generally, the 
first EU country entered is responsible for registering the 
                                                          
25  Eur. Council, supra note 23.  
26  Jennifer Rankin & Jon Henley, EU to consider plans for migrant 
processing centres in north Africa, THE GUARDIAN (June 19, 2018, 10:05 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/19/eu-migrant-processing-
centres-north-africa-refugees. 
27  Sylvia Poggioli, Ascendant ‘Italians First’ Politician Vows Mass 
Deportations And Challenges EU, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (June 29, 2018, 
12:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/623926340/ascendent-italians-
first-politician-vows-mass-deportations-and-challenges-eu. 
28  Silvia Marchetti, Italy is Pleading With Europe to Help Deal with a 
Record Influx of Refugees, TIME (July 11, 2017), http://time.com/4850999/italy-
europe-refugees-frontex-boats-rome-ports-ngos/.  
29  Council Regulation (EU) No. 604/2013 of 26 June 2013, 2013 O.J. (L 
180) 31 (noting the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State 
responsible for examining an application for internal protection lodged in one 
of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person).  
30  European Comm’n, Identification of applicants (EURODAC), 
https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/identification-
of-applicants_en (last visited Oct. 24, 2019).  
5
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asylum application and taking fingerprints.31  Because of the 
overwhelming influx of migrants as a result of these initiatives, 
Italy’s solution to the migrant crisis has been to outsource its 
border security. 
 
In 2017, Italy supplied the Libyan coast guard with vessels 
and anti-smuggling training.32  The agreement promised €285 
million over several years to Libyan agents, who would intercept 
migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea and return them to 
Libyan detention centers.33  On November 14, 2017, United 
Nations (U.N.) Human Rights Chief, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, 
publicly criticized the EU’s migration policy towards Libya.34  
However, Sicilian prosecutor, Carmelo Zuccaro, reported that an 
investigation revealed evidence of direct contacts between some 
non-governmental organizations and human traffickers in 
Libya.35  According to the Missing Migrants Project, during the 
period from February 2, 2017, until the end of January 2019, 
5,389 people died or went missing in the entire Mediterranean 
Sea (Central, Western and Eastern routes).36  In response, 
Oxfam International, along with over fifty other organizations 
and platforms, signed an open letter to EU governments, “calling 
on them to support search and rescue operations in the 
Mediterranean, adopt timely and predictable disembarkation 
arrangements for migrants arriving to European shores, and 
                                                          
31  Id.  
32  Fayez Mustafa Serraj & Paolo Gentiloni, Migranti: accordo Italia-
Libia, il testo del memorandum, LA REPUBBLICA (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/02/02/news/migranti_accordo_italia-
libia_ecco_cosa_contiene_in_memorandum-157464439/?refresh_ce.  
33  Nikolaj Nielsen, EU and Italy put aside €285M to boost Libyan coast 
guard, EUOBSERVER (Nov. 29, 2017, 7:45 AM), 
https://euobserver.com/migration/140067. 
34  Nikolaj Nielsen, UN criticises EU policy in Libya as ‘inhuman’, 
EUOBSERVER (Nov. 15, 2017, 9:17 AM), 
https://euobserver.com/migration/139881.  
35  Maurizio Molinari & Fabio Albanese, “Abbiamo le prove dei contatti tra 
scafisti e alcuni soccorritori”, LA STAMPA (Apr. 23, 2017), 
https://www.lastampa.it/2017/04/23/italia/cronache/abbiamo-le-prove-dei-
contatti-tra-scafisti-e-alcuni-soccorritori-
3fCnqLKWWRHBVUiygHv65K/pagina.html.  
36  INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, Missing Migrants: 
Tracking Deaths Along Migratory Routes, https://missingmigrants.iom.int/ 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2019). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/4
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end returns to Libya.”37 
 
These statistics indicate it’s the “deadliest sea in the 
world.”38  In 2018, the Libyan coast guard reported that it 
intercepted 15,000 migrants trying to reach Italy by sea.39  
However, the U.N. Libya mission reported that 29,000 migrants 
were intercepted or rescued from January to September 2018.40  
From August 2018 to January 2019, approximately 6,400 people 
were being held in twenty-six official prisons operated by the 
Ministry of Justice [in Libya], of whom an estimated seventy-
five to eighty percent were in pretrial detention.41  According to 
a U.N. Support Mission in Libya report, “thousands of others 
[migrants] were being held in facilities nominally under the 
control of the Ministry of the Interior or the Ministry of Defence, 
as well as facilities directly run by armed groups.”42  Detained 
migrants had little opportunity to challenge the legality of their 
detention or seek redress for violations suffered.43  In 2017, CNN 
released a video showing intercepted migrants being sold as 
slaves at auction.44  Additionally, Oxfam released a report 
detailing the experiences of migrants intercepted in Libya who 
were raped, tortured and sold into slave labor.45 
                                                          
37  Letter from Oxfam Int’l, Timely and Predictable European 
Arrangements for Disembarkation, to EU governments (Jan. 30, 2019). 
38  Press Release, Oxfam Int’l, Libya Migration Deal: Two Years on, 
Thousands Drowned in the Mediterranean and Sent Back to Human Rights 
Abuses (Feb. 1, 2019) (emphasis added). 
39  Ulf Laessing & Ahmed Elumami, Libyan coast guard says it has 
intercepted 15,000 migrants in 2018, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2018, 11:20 AM), 
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-europe-migrants-un/libyan-coast-guard-
says-it-has-intercepted-15000-migrants-in-2018-idUKKCN1OJ273; see also 
UNHCR, Libya: Activities at Disembarkation, monthly update (Dec. 2018), 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/67499 (UNHCR’s 2018 study 
showing how Libya has continued to be a transit point for departure from 
North Africa towards Europe).  
40  U.N. High Comm’r, Desperate and Dangerous: Report on the Human 
Rights Situation of Migrants and Refugees in Libya, (Dec. 20, 2018) 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/LY/LibyaMigrationReport.pdf. 
41  U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the United 
Nations Support Mission in Libya, ¶ 30, U.N. Doc. S/2019/19 (Jan. 7, 2019).  
42  Id.  
43  Id. 
44  Nima Elbagir, Raja Razek, Alex Platt & Bryony Jones, People for Sale: 
Where lives are auctioned for $400, CNN: WORLD (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://www.cnn.com/2017/11/14/africa/libya-migrant-auctions/index.html. 
45  OXFAM, OXFAM MEDIA BRIEFING 3–5 (Aug. 9, 2017), 
7
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I. DID ITALY VIOLATE ARTICLE 33 OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES’ 1951 REFUGEE 
CONVENTION? 
The UNCHR was created in 1950—in the aftermath of the 
Second World War—to help millions of people who had fled or 
lost their homes.46  Subsequently, the 1967 Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (the 1967 Protocol) defined a refugee as: 
 
[One who has a] well-founded fear of being persecuted for reason 
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself 
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality 
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it.47 
 
This definition was expanded from the initial 1951 
Convention to reflect the geo-political context of the post-war 
world.48  No formal determination of refugee status by a state or 
international organization is required.49 
 
Before a refugee arrives at a state, the respective “state’s 
obligations are immediately reduced to a few core rights under 
the Convention for which no particular level of attachment is 
specified.”50  Most of the entitlements benefit those already in 
                                                          
https://d1tn3vj7xz9fdh.cloudfront.net/s3fs-public/file_attachments/mb-
migrants-libya-europe-090817-en.pdf. 
46  U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, History of UNCHR, 
http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/history-of-unhcr.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2019).  
47  G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI), Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 
1(2) (Dec. 16, 1966).  
48  RAFIQUL ISLAM & JAHID HOSSAIN BHUIYAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 360 (2013). 
49  U.N. High Comm’r, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees, ¶¶ 22–23, U.N. Doc. E/1985/62 (1985); U.N.H.R.C., Report on the 
Twenty-eighth Session of the Executive Committee of the High Commission’s 
Programme, ¶ 53(4)(c), UN Doc. A/AC.96/549 (1977).  
50  THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, ACCESS TO ASYLUM: INTERNATIONAL 
REFUGEE LAW AND THE GLOBALISATION OF MIGRATION CONTROL 101–102 (James 
Crawford et al. eds., 2011).  
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/4
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the state or with a connection or to the host state.51  A state may 
be considered in violation of its duty of non-refoulement without 
even considering who is at fault if its officials omitted to act or 
acted erroneously or if the state’s legal and administrative 
systems failed to offer a remedy to the refugee—a guarantee of 
which is necessitated by an applicable international standard.52  
There are a few exceptions to the principle of non-refoulement, 
such as instances where a person or persons poses a reasonable 
danger to the security of the country or is convicted by a final 
judgment of serious crime, constituting a danger to the 
community of that country.53 
 
The UNHCR’s 1951 Convention established obligations for 
states who receive refugees; however, “at the enforcement level 
the provisions are commonly ignored by States and other actors 
as a disproportionate amount of energy and resources tends to 
be focused on determining who is a refugee.”54  Refugees and 
asylum seekers are protected under the right to non-refoulement 
and the 1951 Refugee Convention.55  In contrast, migrants are 
protected by international human rights treaties.56  While the 
convention acknowledges that granting asylum “may place 
unduly heavy burdens on certain countries,” its intent was “that 
all States . . . will do everything within their power to prevent 
this problem from becoming a cause of tension between States.”57 
 
“[P]rincipal UN human rights treaties,”58 such as the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights59 and two 1966 
International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights60 and 
                                                          
51  Id.   
52  Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Non-Refoulement and the New Asylum Seekers, 
26 VA. J. INT’L L. 897, 902 (1986); see infra text accompanying nn. 52–55 
(defining non-refoulement).  
53  G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI), supra note 47, art. 33(2).  
54  ISLAM & BHUIYAN, supra note 48, at 249 (emphasis in original).  
55  PAPANICOLOPULU, supra note 5, at 22. 
56  Id.  
57  G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI), supra note 47, at 15. 
58  ISLAM & BHUIYAN, supra note 48, at 249. 
59  G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948). 
60  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].  
9
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,61 “play a supervisory and 
enforcement role in ensuring compliance by state parties with 
the treaty provisions.”62  Compliance is achieved through 
“periodic state party reports by the human rights treaty body,”63 
a “committee established under [the] authority of a particular 
treaty which is made up of an independent group of experts”; or, 
depending on the provisions of the agreement, a treaty body may 
respond to “inter-state and individual complaints and conduct 
field investigations on . . . human rights.”64  Other factors, such 
as offshore migration versus an asylum seeker at the host state, 
affect access to human rights institutions.65  In situations where 
migration control is in the ocean and asylum authorities are on 
land, access to translators and asylum authorities is more 
difficult.66  Moreover, for those turned away at sea, particularly 
those without access to help from organizations, “the likelihood 
that any national human rights institutions will even know 
about the incident is greatly reduced.”67 
 
Two thirds of the nations in the world are parties to the 1951 
Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.68  Italy was a 
signatory of both conventions.69  The principle of non-
refoulement, which prohibits returning people to a country 
where they run the risk of human rights abuses, was established 
in Article 33 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ 
(UNHCR) 1951 Refugee Convention.70  There is no record of 
official or unofficial objections to the principles of non-
refoulement.71  Some scholars have argued that “the principle of 
                                                          
61  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 
3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
62  ISLAM & BHUIYAN, supra note 48, at 249.  
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, supra note 50, at 214.  
66  Id. at 215.  
67  Id. at 216–17.  
68  ISLAM & BHUIYAN, supra note 48, at 248. 
69  See generally U.N. High Comm’r, States Parties to the 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol, (Jan. 31, 1967) 
(showing the signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 
Protocol). 
70  U.N. High Comm’r, Note on Non-Refoulement, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. EC/SCP/2 
(Aug. 23, 1977). 
71  GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol32/iss1/4
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non-refoulement is widely considered to be an international 
customary law,” requiring states, “regardless of their stand on 
human rights and/or the refugee conventions” to comply.72  
Others have challenged this notion, arguing that “[t]he reality of 
state interests militates against complete coverage for 
humanitarian refugees.”73  Under the UNHCR’s 1951 Refugee 
Convention, non-refoulement also includes: 
 
Prohibition on forced return from a potential asylum country at its 
frontiers. . . freedom of association with non-political and non-
profit-making associations and trade unions (Article 15) . . . free 
access to courts of law (Article 16) . . .  and (iv) administrative 
assistance by the Contracting State authority to allow a refugee to 
exercise a right under the Convention (Article 25).74 
 
Moreover, Article 5 of the UNHCR’s 1951 Refugee 
Convention states that “[n]othing in this Convention shall be 
deemed to impair any rights and benefits granted by a 
Contracting State to refugees apart from this [UNHCR’s 1951 
Refugee] Convention.”75  These doctrines can be found in 
international human rights treaties, such as the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;76 the 1966 
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural 
Rights;77 the 1984 Convention against Torture;78 and the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.79 
 
One of the main issues with the Aquarius incident is that at 
the time, no state had assumed de jure responsibility for the 
                                                          
INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 (3d ed.1996).  
72  ISLAM & BHUIYAN, supra note 48, at 115.  
73  Kay Hailbronner, Non-Refoulement and “Humanitarian” Refugees: 
Customary International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?, 26 VA. J. INT’L L. 
857, 858 (1986). 
74  ISLAM & BHUIYAN, supra note 48, at 248.  
75  G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI), supra note 47 art. 5.   
76  ICCPR, supra note 60.  
77  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.  
78  Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment art. 14, ¶ 2, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
79  ISLAM & BHUIYAN, supra note 48, at 248; Convention on the Rights of 
the Child art. 41, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.  
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coordination of search and rescue.  The closest state to the boat, 
Libya, had not established a Search and Rescue Region and 
relied on neighboring countries, like Italy, to handle migrants.80  
Libya officially accepted the existing International Convention 
on Search and Rescue (SAR) obligation in July 2017, but has not 
yet signed the SAR Convention and thus remains unable to 
independently conduct effective operations.81  As a result, Italy’s 
responsibility under SAR would be to take the lead in finding a 
port for disembarkation for ships like the Aquarius.  Under this 
rule, Italy has no obligation to allow disembarkation on its own 
territory. 
 
However, there may be a duty if non-rescued persons fall 
within the jurisdiction of any state while they are in distress at 
sea. Dr. Seline Trevisanut, Assistant Professor at the 
Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, argued that this 
creates de facto duty: 
 
It can be argued that the distress call creates a ‘relation’ between 
the state, which receives it, and the persons who send it . . . . Their 
lives are submitted to the discretion of that state, in the case 
mentioned above the lives of the migrants depended on the Italian 
authorities and there [sic] capacity to activate SAR services.82 
                                                          
80  Alice Cuddy, Prompted by EU, Libya quietly claims right to order 
rescuers to return fleeing migrants, EURONEWS (July 8, 2018), 
https://www.euronews.com/2018/07/06/prompted-by-eu-libya-quietly-claims-
right-to-order-rescuers-to-return-fleeing-migrants.  
81  International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979 (with 
annex) ¶ 1.3.13, Apr. 27, 1949, 1405 U.N.T.S. 109 [hereinafter SAR 
Convention]; Int’l Maritime Org., Reso. MSC. 155/78 Adoption of Amendments 
to the Int’l Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, ch. 3.1.9., MSC 
78/26/Add.1 (May 20, 2004),  https://www.refworld.org/docid/432acad44.html 
(amending the SAR Convention) [hereinafter SAR]; see also U.N. International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue details page, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=08000002800d43b3 (last 
visited Oct. 19, 2019) (listing all up-to-date signatories of the SAR Convention 
and discussing how  the International Maritime Organization (IMO) organized 
the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue in 1979, also 
known as the Search and Rescue Convention (SAR Convention), and  coastal 
states to establish search and rescue services, also discussing how an 
amendment was added to the SAR Convention in 2004, which clarified a duty 
of states to assist in disembarkation of those in distress at sea). 
82  Seline Trevisanut, Law of the Sea Symposium: Search and Rescue 
Operations at Sea – Who is in Charge? Who is Responsible?, OPINIOJURIS (May 
28, 2013), http://opiniojuris.org/2013/05/28/law-of-the-sea-symposium-search-
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This duty would be de jure if the recipient state were in a 
SAR zone because under UNCLOS 98, the state would have an 
obligation to establish adequate and effective search and rescue.  
The SAR Annex defines distress phase as a situation where 
there is a reasonable certainty that a person, a vessel or other 
craft is threatened by grave and imminent danger and requires 
immediate assistance.83 
 
UNCLOS84 and SOLAS85 provide that flag States have an 
obligation to rescue by adopting domestic legislation that creates 
penalties for shipmasters who violate the duty to rescue or 
provide assistance.86  Jurisdictions are broken down by maritime 
zones and flag flown by a rescuing ship.  UNCLOS outlines 
maritime zones whereby states can determine jurisdiction.87  In 
determining jurisdiction, UNCLOS takes into account practical 
considerations, such as how fast coast guard or other rescue 
vessels can reach a particular location.88  The European Union’s 
FRONTEX mission brings together vessels from a number of 
European Union member states and aims to ease the migrant 
burden on coastal states.89  UNCLOS 98(2) “promote[s] the 
establishment, operation and maintenance of adequate and 
effective” SAR operations.90 
Moreover, Regulation 2(1)(10) of the Annex expressly 
mandates assistance to any persons regardless of their status.91  
SALVAGE Article 11 “ensure[s] efficient and successful 
                                                          
and-rescue-operations-at-sea-who-is-in-charge-who-is-responsible/.  
83  SAR Convention, supra note 81, ¶ 1.3.11. 
84  U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 98(1), Dec. 10, 1932, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
85  Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], ch. V, Regs. 7, 10, and 33, Safety of Life at 
Sea, (1974 as amended), 
http://library.arcticportal.org/1696/1/SOLAS_consolidated_edition2004.pdf 
[hereinafter SOLAS]. 
86  SAR Convention, supra note 81, ¶ 2.1.10. 
87  UNCLOS, supra note 84, arts. 35, 86. 
88  Stefan Kirchner, Katarzyna Geler-Noch & Vanessa Frese, Coastal 
State Obligations in the Context of Refugees at Sea Under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 20 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 57, 77 (2015). 
89 European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex), EUROPEAN UNION, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/agencies/frontex_en.  
90  UNCLOS, supra note 84, art. 98(2). 
91  SAR Convention, supra note 81, ¶¶ 2.1.1, 2.1.10. 
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performance of salvage operations for the purpose of saving a life 
or property in danger.”92 SAR’s scope of duty to rescue provides 
for initial medical and other needs to deliver persons to a place 
of safety.93  How States and seafarers should cooperate with 
persons rescued at sea was clarified by IMO’s amendments to 
SAR and SOLAS Conventions.  In 2003, the IMO Maritime and 
Safety Committee approved Resolution A.920(22).94  These 
amendments were entered into force on July 1, 2006.  In 2004, 
the MSC Committee adopted Guides on the Treatment of 
Persons Rescued at Sea, coordinating and assisting the ship 
Master towards delivery of persons to a place of safety.95 Recent 
amendments to the SAR Convention have further clarified the 
definitions of persons in distress,96 cooperation between states 
relating to the assistance of delivering persons rescued at sea to 
a place of safety,97 and the disembarking process for persons 
found in distress at sea.98  These new amendments focus on the 
responsibility of State parties to coordinate actions and assist 
the ship to deliver persons to a place of safety.99 
 
In the case of the Aquarius, Italy would likely argue that 
principle of non-refoulement creates an incentive for those 
migrants willing to take a risk in the hope that they will be 
rescued and receive protection by a state they wish to reside in.  
                                                          
92  Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], art. 11, International Convention on Salvage 
(Apr. 4, 1989), 
https://www.jus.uio.no/lm/imo.salvage.convention.1989/doc.html. 
93  Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], ch. 1.3.2, Adoption of Amendments to the 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (May 18, 1998), 
http://www.imo.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/IndexofIMOResolutions/Maritime-
Safety-Committee-(MSC)/Documents/MSC.70(69).pdf. 
94  Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], Res. A.920(22), Review of Safety Measures 
and Procedures for the Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea (Nov. 29, 2001), 
http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Facilitation/personsrescued/Documents/Reso
lution%20A.920(22).pdf.  
95  Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], ch. 3, Res. MSC.167(78), Adoption of 
Amendments to the Int’l Convention on Maritime (May 20, 2004) [hereinafter 
Adoption of Amendments]. 
96  Id. ¶ 2.3; see also Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], at 2, IMO Feature: SOLAS 
and SAR Amendments to Strengthen International Rescue Regime (July 1, 
2006), https://www.steamshipmutual.com/SAR_SOLAS_IMOFeature.pdf 
(outlining the amendments made to SOLAS and SAR Convention). 
97  Adoption of Amendments, supra note 95, ¶¶ 1.2, 2.1.2, 6.5.3.  
98  Id. ¶¶ 6.5.2, 6.6, 6.14.   
99   U.N. Secretary-General, Oceans and the Law of the Sea, ¶ 314, U.N. 
Doc. A/59/62Add.1 (Aug. 18, 2004).  
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Moreover, it would argue that interceptions are necessary to 
combat illegal immigration; smuggling and trafficking 
activity;100 and to deter undocumented asylum-seekers acting as 
“irregular movers,” by continuing to seek protection after it has 
been secured by a country.101  However, within the European 
Court of Human Rights, the emerging practice is to hold states 
to a non-refoulement obligation in extraterritorial migration 
cases.102 
 
Critics argue that UNHCR’s protections for refugees are 
unsatisfactory and require reforms.103  According to scholar 
Matteo Tondini, former military legal adviser to the Italian 
Navy General Staff in the Office of Legal Affairs, “one should 
also observe that the interception of migrants on the high seas 
can only be considered a short-term measure, unfit to control 
large migration flows.  Addressing the roots of migration in the 
countries of origin and departure appears to be the only feasible 
solution in this respect.”104  Moreover, politicians and press in 
Western democracies have “demonized”105 those fleeing conflicts 
in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, suggesting “that the 
asylum system is a loophole permitting economic migration.”106  
Critics note the “UNHCR has not put Article 35 . . . to full effect, 
whereby Contracting States undertake to provide the UNHCR 
relevant information and statistical data on inter alia the 
implementation of the Convention.”107  Furthermore, some have 
argued that “[t]here exists no system of review of country 
practices through the public examination of state party 
reports”108 and “the extent of UNHCR involvement largely 
                                                          
100  U.N. High Comm’r, Interception of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: The 
International Framework and Recommendations for a Comprehensive 
Approach, ¶¶ 3, 14, U.N. Doc. EC/50/SC/CRP.17 (June 9, 2000).  
101  Id.  ¶ 15. 
102  See infra Part II.  
103  ISLAM & BHUIYAN, supra note 48, at 249. 
104  Matteo Tondini, The Legality of Intercepting Boat People Under Search 
and Rescue and Border Control Operations: With Reference to Recent Italian 
Interventions in the Mediterranean Sea and the ECtHR Decision in the Hirsi 
Case, 18 J. INT’L MAR. L. 59, 74 (2012).  
105  CHRISTOPHER BERTRAM, DO STATES HAVE THE RIGHT TO EXCLUDE 
IMMIGRANTS? 41 (2018). 
106  Id.  
107  ISLAM & BHUIYAN, supra note 48, at 250. 
108  Id. 
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depends on the scope of permission granted to the UNHCR by 
the receiving country as well as the resources available.”109  
Situations such as fear of private militias or criminal gangs and 
displacement caused by natural disasters or climate change are 
not protected by UNHCR.110 
II. DID ITALY VIOLATE ARTICLE 1 OF THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS? 
The ECHR, signed in 1950, aimed to have “the governments 
of European countries which are like-minded and have a 
common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the 
rule of law, to take the first steps for the collective enforcement 
of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration [of 
Human Rights].”111  Italy joined the EU in 1958,112 and thus is 
bound by international law and its respective obligations.113  The 
ECHR and the Law of the Sea intersect “mainly on the high 
seas.”114  Part VII of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the 
Sea115 regulates the high seas.116  The fundamental principle 
mare liberum means that “the high seas are common to all 
States and that no State may purport to subject any part of them 
to its territorial sovereignty.”117  Article 1 of the ECHR regards 
state responsibility for civil and political rights in terms of a 
                                                          
109  Id. 
110  BERTRAM, supra note 105, at 42.  
111  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR]; see also G.A. 
Res. 217A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1948) (referring to 
adopted rules in 1948, which focused on the protection of human rights by rule 
of law). 
112  EU Member Countries in Brief, EUROPEAN UNION, 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en 
(last visited Apr. 7, 2019).  
113  See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (a treaty concerning the international law on treaties 
between states themselves and within an intergovernmental organization). 
114  Efthymios Papastavridis, European Convention on Human Rights and 
the Law of the Sea: The Strasbourg Court in Unchartered Waters?, in THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 115, 120 (Malgosia Fitzmaurice & 
Panos Merkouris eds., 2012). 
115  UNCLOS, supra note 84. 
116  Papastavridis, supra note 114, at 120.  
117  Id. 
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State’s jurisdiction.118  Therefore, a state must acknowledge its 
responsibilities to refugees within its jurisdiction, pertaining to 
a refugee’s basic legal and fundamental rights.119  This 
mandates a state’s compliance with the Convention.120  Article 1 
of the ECHR also requires that nobody be considered outside the 
law.121  The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) “is a 
treaty body established for the protection of what is traditionally 
considered civil and political rights as they are enumerated in 
the ECHR and its Protocols.”122 
 
Moreover, the ECHR has ruled that its prohibition was 
“already inherent in the general terms of Article 3,”123 which 
requires contracting parties to protect individuals “within their 
jurisdiction” from inhuman treatment.124  In the seminal 
decision Soering v. United Kingdom, the United Kingdom was 
held responsible because the ECtHR considered the intended 
extradition of a person to the United States incompatible with 
Article 3 of the ECHR, due to the threat of capital punishment.125  
This case reflects an expansion of the state’s responsibility to 
individuals in returning an individual to a third country where 
said individual may face treatment in breach of the Refugee 
Convention. 
 
Other recent court cases by the ECHR have established 
some level of enforcement for offshore migration, where domestic 
courts may not have jurisdiction.126  Whether a state possesses 
extraterritorial jurisdiction is based on the level of a state’s 
effective control over the relevant foreign person or territory.127  
                                                          
118  ECHR, supra note 111, art. 1.  
119  Kirchner, Geler-Noch & Frese, supra note 88, at 74.  
120  Id.  
121  ECHR, supra note 111, art. 1. 
122  IDA ELISABETH KOCH, HUMAN RIGHTS AS INDIVISIBLE RIGHTS: THE 
PROTECTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEMANDS UNDER THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 9 (2009).  
123  Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 88 (1989); see 
also Hirsi v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 113–14 (2012) (discussing generally 
the risk of a fugitive being subjected to inhumane treatment). 
124  Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 65–67, (2004). 
125  Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶ 219(6). 
126  Id.  
127  Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 
589 ¶¶ 130–49 (2011); Bankovic ́ v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 44 Eur. H.R. 
17
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In several cases, the ECtHR Grand Chamber has applied the 
effective control test in the maritime context to determine 
whether a European state possesses jurisdiction over persons 
whom the state encountered extraterritorially.128  In Hirsi, the 
existence of effective control depended on the level of physical 
control the European state had over the individuals themselves 
or their vessels.129  In that case, the applicants consisted of 200 
Somali and Eritrean nationals who were part of three vessels 
that left Libya and were subsequently intercepted by Italian 
coastal authorities on the high seas.130  The court reasoned that 
when a person is on a boat flying the flag of one State, it is under 
that State’s jurisdiction.131  Furthermore, when that boat is a 
boat of the State’s coast guard, it is under the effective control of 
the State, which in itself is a basis for jurisdiction.132  This is 
affirmed in UNCLOS Article 92.133  The Italian coast guard 
returned the migrants to Libya to be repatriated to Somalia and 
Eritrea, violating both non-refoulement and the prohibition on 
collective expulsion.134  Since these operations were conducted in 
the Mediterranean Sea and in the absence of any individual 
screening of intercepted migrants, their violation of the non-
refoulement principle was deemed illegal per se.135 
 
In Hirsi, the ECtHR held that the interception and return 
                                                          
Rep. SE5 ¶¶ 70–71 (2007); see generally Marko Milanovic, EXTRATERRITORIAL 
APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY 118–66 
(2011) (discussing generally the effective control test and both the personal and 
territorial models of jurisdiction). 
128  Medvedyev v. France, App. No. 3394/03, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 67 (2010); 
see Hirsi, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 66–67, 81. 
129  See Hirsi, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 66–67, 81 (discussing generally 
external border management and surveillance); see also Medvedyev, 51 Eur. 
Ct. H.R., ¶ 67 (discussing generally the right to board and inspect foreign 
vessels). 
130  Hirsi, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 9–12 (2012). 
131  Id. ¶¶ 67, 77.  
132  Id. ¶¶ 77–81. 
133  UNCLOS, supra note 84, art. 92. 
134  Hirsi, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 138, 186; see also Eur. Ct. H.R. Press 
Unit, Factsheet – Collective expulsions of aliens, (July 2019) 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Collective_expulsions_ENG.pdf 
(defining collective expulsion as any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to 
leave a country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a 
reasonable and objective examination of the particular case of each individual 
alien of the group). 
135  Tondini, supra note 104, at 74.  
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of the migrant vessels established “effective control.”136  The 
court determined Italy to have “effective control” by taking into 
consideration the location of the migrants; the length of time 
during which the migrants were subject to Italian control; and 
the national composition of the crew.137  In addition, the court 
specified that “the events [causing the human rights abuses] 
took place entirely on board ships of the Italian armed forces.”138  
Furthermore, the Italian vessel retained full control over the 
migrants for roughly ten hours without interruption.139  The 
ECtHR has developed two effective control tests to determine 
extraterritoriality: control over a defined territory140 and 
exercising state authority over an individual.141  ECtHR case law 
is a “piecemeal approach that tries to tailor the notion of effective 
control to different situations without one clear definition.”142  In 
2011, ECtHR ruled on two cases: Al-Skeini v. the United 
Kingdom143 and Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom,144 and in both 
cases held the United Kingdom legally responsibility for the 
death of Iraqi civilians during the Iraq War.  The EctHR builds 
on previous case law in Al-Jedda; however, the court in Al-Skeini 
distinguishes three situations that trigger extraterritorial 
                                                          
136  Hirsi, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 9–14, 81–82. 
137  Id.  
138  Id. ¶ 81. 
139  Id. ¶¶ 66, 81 (underscoring the “continuous” nature of the interaction, 
citing to Medvedyev in which “uninterrupted control” by the Member State for 
a multiday period established jurisdiction); see Medvedyev, 3394/03, ¶¶ 66–67 
(noting that the applicants were not placed on the French vessels themselves, 
but rather the French commando team possessed “exclusive” control over the 
vessel in which the team confined the applicants for thirteen days). 
140  See Bankovic ́ v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 44 Eur. H.R. Rep. ¶ 71–
72 (2001) (stating that effective control can exist upon an evaluation of the 
nature and extent of such territorial control); see generally Cyprus v. Turkey, 
App. No. 25781/94 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 75–76 (2001) (establishing the concept that 
action taken by a nation in another defined territory can result in effective 
control). 
141  Tom De Boer, Closing Legal Black Holes: The Role of Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction in Refugee Rights Protection, 28 J. REFUGEE STUD. 118, 125 (2015); 
see Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 54 (2005) (affirming the 
concept that an exercise of state authority within another territory can result 
in effective control). 
142  De Boer, supra note 141. 
143  Al-Skeini v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Rep. 75–76 (2011).  
144  Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 27021/08, Eur. Ct. H.R. 
Rep. 65–66 (2008).  
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jurisdiction.145  In Al-Skeini, the court found that the following 
situations trigger extraterritorial jurisdiction: 
 
First, when it concerns the acts of diplomatic and consular agents 
present on foreign territory . . . . Second, when a state, through 
consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that 
territory, ‘exercises all or some of the public powers normally to be 
exercised by that government’ . . . . And third, when the use of 
force by state agents operating outside their territory ‘bring[s] the 
individual . . . under the control of the State’s authorities into the 
State’s Article 1 jurisdiction.’146 
 
Looking to the ECtHR’s ruling in Hirsi, the court used a 
functional approach towards Article 4 of Protocol 4, regarding 
the question of expelling individuals who have not yet reached a 
state’s territory.147  In his concurring opinion, Judge Pinto de 
Albuquerque noted that “[a] state cannot evade its treaty 
obligations in respect of refugees by using the device of changing 
the place of determination of their status.”148  The importance of 
the ECtHR’s functional approach provides legal recourse for 
individuals in push-back operations.  At the height of the Libyan 
conflict, over 55,000 migrants and asylum seekers from Tunisia 
and Libya reached Lampedusa, an Italian island.149  The 
migrants came from Tunisia and were fleeing the Arab Spring 
in 2011.150  Some migrants were detained for nine to twelve days 
without administrative measures reviewable by a court.151  
Article 5 of the ECHR allows for the lawful detention of a person 
“to prevent his effecting an unauthori[z]ed entry into the country 
or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view to 
                                                          
145  De Boer, supra note 141, at 127. 
146  Id.; see also Al-Skeini, 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. ¶¶ 134–36 
(identifying three situations which may trigger extraterritorial jurisdiction).  
147  Hirsi v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 201–07 (2012). 
148  Id. at 76 (De Albuquerque, J., concurring). 
149  EUR. PARL. ASS., Report on the visit to Lampedusa, AS/Mig/AhLarg 
(May 23-24, 2011); see also Rep. of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human rights, 
The Situation of Migrants and Asylum-Seekers Fleeing Recent Events in 
North Africa, A/HRC/18/54, GE.11-15605, at 3, 7–8 (2011) (discussing 
interception and deaths at sea of migrants and asylum seekers, specifically 
those who attempted to migrate to Lampedusa).  
150  Olly Lambert, Italy’s Lampedusa left in crisis after Arab Spring, BBC 
(June 14, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13747558.  
151  Khlaifia v. Italy, App. No. 16483/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 62 (2016). 
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deportation or extradition.”152  However, this detention must “be 
decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the 
detention is not lawful.”153  The court in Hirsi found Italy to be 
in violation of Article 3, which establish the right to a speedy 
trial on lawfulness of detention.154 
 
The ECtHR also ruled in Xhavara v. Italy, that the ECHR 
applies when the SAR operation is performed on the basis of an 
international agreement and there is contact between the 
rescuing unit and the vessel in distress.155  In this case, an 
Italian naval corvette collided with and a sunk Albanian boat 
transporting undocumented immigrants thirty-five nautical 
miles off the Italian coast in international waters.156  The ECtHR 
held that applicants were under Italian territorial jurisdiction, 
per Article 1 of the ECHR, and Italy had an obligation to take 
necessary and precautionary measures to protect the lives of 
persons under its jurisdiction.157  Likewise, the ECtHR ruled in 
Al-Skeini that there is an assumption of authority the coastal 
state exercises in a SAR zone.158  In sum, the loss of lives may 
entail violation of the right to life. 
 
In the case of the Aquarius, a case could be made for the 
presence of “effective control.”  Here, Italian personnel and 
vessels themselves are not exerting any direct physical control, 
for any length of time, over migrant persons.  The non-
refoulement principle specified in Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention159 is also binding upon European states under the 
ECHR, despite an absence of the provision.  Italy’s practice in 
migrant control on the high seas reflects an effort to 
“[circumvent] basic human rights obligations, either because 
they are not applicable extraterritorially or when private actors 
carry out controls, or because these rights are simply not 
                                                          
152  ECHR, supra note 111, art. 5.  
153  Id.  
154  Hirsi v. Italy, 2012-II Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 56–58 (2012). 
155  Xhavara v. Italy, App. No. 39473/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. (2001). 
156  Id.  
157  Id.  
158  Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, Eur. Ct. H.R. Rep. 
(2011). 
159  See supra Part I.  
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realised.”160  Italy could also be held in violation of Article 16 of 
the Articles on State Responsibility,161 which deals with aiding 
and abetting the internationally wrongful act of another State. 
It provides that: 
 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of 
an internationally wrongful act by the latter is internationally 
responsible for doing so if: (a) that State does so with knowledge of 
the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and (b) the 
act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that 
State.162 
 
Here, Italy’s actions in the Aquarius case presented possible 
liabilities.  Italy, in making a deal with Libya regarding the 
Aquarius, is at a minimum level aware of the human rights 
abuses in the state, making it a violation of non-refoulement.  
Italy’s instruction to intercept and avoid rescuing the migrants 
at sea can be viewed as facilitating a wrongful act.  Moreover, 
Italy’s return of the ship would be an internationally wrongful 
act, if committed by Italy. 
III. THE FUTURE OF MIGRANTS IN ITALY 
To date, the European Union has failed in its response to 
the flow of migrants and asylum seekers landing at its shores in 
search of security and a better life. Italy’s response is typical.  
Since 1986, proposals have been presented by various Member 
States to manage the sharp increases in incoming migration 
flows. States like Denmark,163 the United Kingdom,164 and 
Italy,165 as well as organizations like the UNHCR,166 have all put 
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forward proposals aimed at identifying ‘new’ extraterritorial 
approaches to refugee protection.167  In sum, these proposals call 
for the creation of third-country processing centers (also known 
as offshore processing centers) and/or of regional protection 
areas.  The former are centers outside of the EU to which 
migrants are transferred and effectively detained while their 
asylum claim is processed.  In theory, if the claim is successful, 
the individual can then be resettled in a Member State or in an 
alternative safe country.  If the claim is unsuccessful, they can 
be returned to their country of origin.  The latter, on the other 
hand, aims to provide temporary protection to refugees within 
their region of origin.168 
 
In July 2017, Vincent Cochetel, UNHCR Special Envoy to 
the Central Mediterranean, also announced his support for 
“screening systems for EU-bound migrants in countries en route 
to Libya, such as Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Chad and 
Sudan.”169  This followed a proposal by African and European 
ministers in Tunis discussed earlier that month. Cochetel said, 
“Italy also needs to be able to process claimants so the economic 
migrants are returned much more quickly, or else there will be 
no deterrent to travel to Italy. Only a third of the migrants 
reaching Italy are found to need international protection.”170 
 
As Italy and other countries shift towards establishing an 
offshore asylum mechanism, the question becomes who bears 
responsibility in scenarios of extraterritorial complicity? Is it the 
European Union and Member States, third countries (Niger or 
Chad which sent migrants through Libya) and/or the UN 
organizations, IOM and UNHCR?171  In regard to claims within 
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the ECtHR, Italy could be found in violation of Article 13.  Italy’s 
offshore process refused migrants and circumvented the “Dublin 
transfers,” since responsibility and protection for asylum claims 
lies with the country of first arrival.172  In the case of the 
Aquarius, migrants were returned to Libya, resulting in human 
trafficking and detention. 
 
Moreover, there have been significant backlogs in 
processing asylum claims and inability of individuals to access 
procedures offshore.173  In May 2015, the European Commission 
introduced a “hot spot” approach to frontline countries like Italy, 
who face “disproportionate migratory pressures at the EU’s 
external borders.”174  This approach provided assistance from 
the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), EU Border 
Agency (Frontex), EU Police Cooperation Agency (Europol), and 
EU Judicial Cooperation Agency (Eurojust) to help Italy fulfill 
its obligations under EU law by identifying, registering, and 
fingerprinting incoming migrants.175  The “hot spot” approach 
further requires that migrants receive the appropriate follow-up 
procedures, such as a national asylum application, relocation to 
another Member State or repatriation.176  Four ports identified 
as “hot spot” locations were Pozzallo, Porto Empedocle, Trapani 
in Sicily, and Lampedusa.177  Yet, a study published in 2017 by 
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the European Court of Auditors found that only “four out of six 
planned hot spots were operational in March 2016, and two 
additional hotpots were still in the process of being set up but 
not yet operational at the end of February 2017.”178  The report 
further found that at the end of 2016, the reception facilities in 
Italy were not sufficient to receive the number of migrants 
arriving.179  Furthermore, the European Commission’s 10th 
Report on Relocation and Resettlement explained that the lack 
of pledges of Member States, and more specifically, the lack of a 
dedicated procedure for the relocation of unaccompanied minors 
or specific requirements for security interviews, is the reason 
Italy remains behind in implementation of the emergency 
relocation of migrants.180 
 
Yet, despite Member States’ current challenges with high 
migratory pressure, the ECtHR has continued to uphold EU law 
and guarantee the rights of migrants and refugees, opposing 
pushback operations.  In Khlaifia v. Italy, the justices wrote 
“[t]he Court has also taken note of the ‘new challenges’ facing 
European States in terms of immigration control as a result of 
the economic crisis [and] recent social and political changes 
which have had a particular impact on certain regions of Africa 
and the Middle East.”181  Moreover, in the ECtHR case of N.D. v. 
Spain, a group of Sub-Saharan migrants tried to enter Spain on 
August 13, 2014 through the Melilla border crossing, consisting 
of three consecutive barriers.182  The migrants were 
apprehended by Spanish guards at the third barrier and 
subsequently returned to Morocco without an identification 
check, an interpreter, or opportunity to receive legal and medical 
assistance.183  N.D. v. Spain addresses Spain’s pushback 
operations and the court’s confirmation that the use of force by 
state agents at a land border triggers a State’s jurisdiction under 
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Article 1 ECHR. 
 
Pushback operations include “[the lack of accessibility to] 
the UNHCR, refugee-assisting NGOs, national human rights 
institutions or lawyers of the state carrying out control.”184  It 
also includes Member States’ noncompliance in relocating185 and 
resettling186 people from these centers, even once their claims for 
international protection are established.  In addition to 
compensation to victims, the EU and international community 
should consider burden-sharing elements that might help states 
like Italy cope with disembarkations; ideas include a flexible list 
of safe ports along the European coastline of cities willing to 
accept disembarkations of migrants, and an updated Dublin 
system, which has currently put an unequal burden on coastal 
states. 
 
The Aquarius incident presents an issue of jurisdiction 
under Article 1 of the ECHR.  The traditional approach to 
jurisdiction stemming from a state’s effective control over a 
person or territory does not apply here as there is no such control 
over the place where the detention and processing will be 
conducted.  Scholar Miles Jackson argues that the court’s ruling 
in Soering can be extended to cases of extraterritorial state 
complicity, leading to a ban on facilitation of acts of torture at 
home or abroad under Article 3 ECHR.187 Perhaps similar 
arguments can be made against Italy for violations of Articles 3, 
5, and 13 ECHR.  Moreover, scholar Marko Milanovic argues for 
a territorially unlimited approach for any state to refrain from 
assisting third states or individuals in violating human rights.188 
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Jackson has put forth five arguments, which may be used to 
establish jurisdiction in cases of extraterritorial complicity.189  
His first argument is that Soering interpreted the ECHR as a 
“living instrument,”190 that “must be interpreted in the light of 
present-day conditions.”191  Applying this logic, one could argue 
for a more expansive interpretation of jurisdiction under Article 
1.  The migration policies of Italy and fellow Member States have 
relied on extraterritorial measures to circumvent human rights 
obligations.  In this interpretation, Italy’s offshore activities 
would be considered to be within the scope of the ECHR as well 
as attempts to circumvent existing obligations of the Member 
States.  Jackson’s second argument focuses on the nature of the 
violations, specifically Articles 2, 3, and 6 and of ECHR’s 
prohibition against torture, which is linked to Article 3’s non-
refoulement regulation.192  Third, Jackson argues that 
“overcoming the jurisdictional gap would render states’ 
obligations under the ECHR consistent with their other 
international obligations.”193  In Soering, the ECtHR used the 
reasoning in Article 3 of the Convention against Torture thus 
creating consistency between the two.194 
 
Fourth, he argues the court in Soering established state 
responsibility for the “foreseeable consequences of extradition 
suffered outside their jurisdiction,”195 demanding “states take 
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responsibility for wrongdoing they facilitate.”196  Forms of 
facilitation may include leading or supporting offshore 
mechanisms, putting pressure on other countries either 
financially or otherwise for migration control measures and 
training and equipping the authorities of a third country to 
execute migration control.  Lastly, the “inconsistency and lack of 
coherence” of the ECtHR’s interpretation of Article 1 has in 
effect facilitated violations abroad, which would otherwise be 
impermissible in the home state.  Thus, allowing states to 
offshore, outsource and buy their way out of the obligations 
vested upon them, flies in the face of the principle of universality 
of rights.197  An enhanced interpretation would prevent “absurd 
results and the universality of rights.”198 Therefore, the ECtHR 
should broaden its interpretation of an Article 1 jurisdiction. 
 
Shortly after the Aquarius’ refusal, Italy refused another 
ship in August 2018.199  The Ubaldo Diciotti, an Italian coast 
guard ship, which carried 177 migrants and was unable to 
disembark in Sicily for five days.200  The ship picked up 190 
migrants—a majority of which were from Eritrea, with some 
people from Bangladesh, Syria, and Egypt—on August 15 from 
an overcrowded boat seventeen miles off Lampedusa after they 
were refused entry to Malta.201  The boat was allowed to 
disembark after an agreement with the European Union to 
relocate the migrants.202  According to CNN, “[t]he European 
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Commission confirmed it has been contacted by Italian 
authorities regarding the ship but stated it cannot solve the 
standoff because “it’s a matter for national authorities.” [The 
Commission further stated] “[w]e don’t have competence to 
coordinate search-and-rescue operations or to indicate places for 
disembarkation . . . it started contacting member states about 
the matter.”203 
 
In summer 2018, Italy maintained its position that it would 
not accept additional migrants.204  It held this position despite 
immense scrutiny by the international community and the 
press.  Italy’s refusal of the Ubaldo Diciotti highlighted the need 
for a new approach and a better international enforcement 
mechanism.  The June 28th migration deal proposing feasibility 
of building migrant processing centers in North Africa reflects 
Italy’s and the European Council’s tough approach to 
immigration.205  On the other hand, “African nations have been 
reluctant to host what the EU calls ‘disembarkation platforms,’ 
fearing they could become magnets for crowds of migrants 
seeking asylum in Europe as well as targets for jihadist 
groups.”206  An African Union position paper leaked to The 
Guardian argued that with such platforms, “migrants, after 
they have been rescued (or a fortiori after they have been 
brought back on to European Union territory), could not be sent 
to platforms outside of the European Union without being 
granted access to the EU asylum procedures and without being 
granted the possibility to wait for the complete examination of 
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their request.”207 
 
In comparison, in 2013 Australia enacted a policy named 
Regional Resettlement Arrangement Between Australia and 
Papua New Guinea.208  This policy aimed to discourage 
smuggling of migrants and transferred migrants arriving by 
boat to Manus Island in Papua New Guinea or Nauru.209  The 
policy states that it upholds the non-refoulement principle in the 
UNHCR since regional processing centers are not a final 
destination for permanent resettlement.210  According to 
Elizabeth Collett, Director of Migration Policy Institute Europe, 
despite “international outrage,” “the measures have curbed 
mass migration and prevented people from drowning at sea 
while trying to reach Australia.”211  In 2018, “nearly 1,000 people 
lost their lives trying to cross the Mediterranean and reach 
Europe, according to the International Organization for 
Migration, a United Nations agency.”212 
 
Setting up migration and resettlement centers outside of the 
European Union presents an issue of being out of sight and 
potentially out of mind of European countries.  However, 
reducing deaths by sea and avoiding incidents such as the 
Aquarius, where migrants are trapped on board for days with 
limited food and medical care, is advantageous.  Disembarkation 
platforms could permit a more controlled assessment of which 
migrants are entitled to legal protection by the EU before they 
get resettled.  According to The Wall Street Journal, “Vincent 
Cochetel, special envoy of the UNHCR for the Central 
Mediterranean, tentatively endorsed the EU plans and said 
detaining immigrants was admissible under EU law.”213  Mr. 
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Cochetel said, “[d]etention is not what we wish for the majority 
of people, but in some circumstances it would be necessary in 
order to repatriate some people.”214  He further stated “more 
than 70% of asylum claims of people who have crossed the 
Mediterranean get rejected, but they don’t get returned after 
reaching Europe.  ‘Those who are not in need of protection 
should be encouraged to return, voluntarily or otherwise.’”215  
Therefore, if migrants know that they will not be able to go onto 
European land without first proving their right to asylum, it is 
less likely that those who have no such right will fall for the 
human traffickers offering dangerous passages to Europe. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As of July 2019, “about 19 sea rescue missions—involving 
nongovernmental ships but also commercial and military 
vessels—have been blocked from Italian ports, keeping ‘more 
than 2,500 people blocked at sea for an overall period of 165 
days,’” according to Marco Bertotto of Doctors Without Borders 
Italy.216  In March 2019, the European Commission announced 
on Twitter that “Europe is no longer experiencing the migration 
crisis of 2015, but structural problems remain.”217  The 
European Commission later released “Progress report on the 
Implementation of the European Agenda on Migration” in June 
2019.218  The report stated that “[o]verall, 2018 saw a fall of 80% 
in irregular arrivals to Italy compared to 2017, and this trend 
has continued in 2019 to drop to pre-crisis levels.”219  However, 
Italy was still a main country of first entry in 2018.220  The report 
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also clarified that, “[t]he EU will maintain pressure to ensure 
unhindered and regular access for humanitarian organisations 
and UN agencies to improve conditions in detention centres, to 
increase alternatives to detention, and ultimately to put an end 
to the current system of detention.”221 
 
Moreover, Italy replaced Interior Minister Salvini with 
Luciana Lamorgese in September 2019, marking the appearance 
of a shift in Italy’s anti-immigration policies.222  Lamorgese was 
appointed after the formation of the new coalition government 
between the Five Star Movement and the Democratic Party.223  
However, in October 2019, a rescue ship called the Ocean Viking, 
carrying 104 migrants, was stuck at sea for 11 days until being 
allowed to disembark in Pozzallo, Italy.224  The ship is run by the 
SOS Méditerranée and funded in partnership with Doctors 
Without Borders, the same groups that supported the 
Aquarius.225  After initially refusing the ship, Italian authorities 
“only changed their position after the French, German and 
Italian governments agreed on a plan to resettle the migrants on 
board.”226 According to Louise Guillaumat, deputy director of 
SOS Méditerranée, the NGO which operates the Ocean Viking, 
“‘[w]hen a relocation agreement is settled, Italy is willing to open 
its ports . . . . But there are few E.U. member states willing to 
welcome people into their territory and support the coastal 
states’ of Italy and Malta.’”227  Despite efforts by the European 
Commission to make reforms, clearer guidelines and better 
structure is needed to facilitate a safer and more streamlined 
immigration process in Italy. 
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In aiming towards a better solution to the migrant crisis in 
Italy and more broadly in Europe, it is important to distinguish 
“between unwilling and unable states in the context of shared 
responsibility.”228  Some critics have proposed placing the 
burden on the host state to be individually responsible for 
providing protection as opposed to UNHCR and the 
international community at large.229  One proposed idea is 
promoting shared responsibility between a host state and 
UNHCR, for states that are unable to host due “to limited 
resources or weak institutions.”230  Another idea, which “often 
meets with very fierce opposition,”231 is open borders.  However, 
due to concerns regarding labor market competition, changes in 
cultural character, safety, and sustainability, it is unlikely this 
will prevail.232  While some research has shown that open 
borders are beneficial to the economy, “[p]olitical opposition to 
free migration of labor is based to some extent on the prediction 
that immigration depresses real wages in the host country.”233 
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